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1. Introduction
If metaphor is to be viewed as a fundamental cognitive agency, as recent work 
suggests, what ramifications does this view have for a model of semantic memory? 
This paper presents a computational treatment of metaphor comprehension, named 
Sapper (see Veale & Keane. 1993, 1994; Veale et al. 1995, 1996), which is built upon 
a parallel, adaptive, and learning network model of semantic memory. Sapper is a 
hybrid symbolic connectionist model which views the interpretation of novel 
metaphors as a process of connectionist bridge-building, a process which 
subsequently alters the activation dynamics between different conceptual schemata in 
semantic memory, thereby causing these schemata to interact (following Black, 1962) 
in a representationally dynamic fashion. 
Sapper employs a bottom-up approach to metaphor comprehension, one which 
encourages the existing structure of semantic memory to shape and accommodate the 
most consonant interpretation for each concept juxtaposition. In this way, the entirety 
of contingent background knowledge is brought to bear on the interpretation process. 
However, the Sapper mechanism combines the base-filtering stage of interpretation 
with the formation of initial match hypotheses in a single connectionist phase, thereby 
significantly curtailing the sweep of the matching process and side-stepping the 
factorial death that models such as SME, the Structure Mapping Engine (see Gentner 
1983) and ACME, the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine (see Holyoak & 
Thagard 1989) can all too easily fall victim to. Such factorial demise occurs because 
of the inherent unscalability of these models: as the problem at hand grows larger, the 
computational resources demanded by such models also grows, but at an exponential 
rate, quickly outstripping even the most generously equipped machines, and in theory, 
outpacing even the computational power of the human brain. In fact, this paper will 
provide empirical evidence that SME and ACME are fundamentally unsuited to the 
interpretation of a broad class of metaphors that rely on an object-centred, as opposed 
to predicate-centred, representation. These metaphors, which often find linguistic 
expression as noun: noun comparisons, depend mainly upon the adequate 
representation of object partonomies and taxonomies, rather than the representation of 
actions and events toward which models such as these are inherently biased. This 
evidence casts grave epistemological doubts on the validity of these models as 
cognitive theories of human metaphor comprehension.
1.1. Structure of This Paper
This paper addresses a single, but broadly sweeping, question: What representational 
and computational demands are placed upon a model of semantic memory by a theory 
that views metaphor as a dynamic conceptual agency, and what constitutes good and 
bad solutions to these demands? This paper provides an answer in the form of a 
hybrid model of memory which marries the complementary strengths of both the 
symbolic and connectionist paradigms. Our discussion of this model will observe the 
following course: section two presents the motivations and guiding metaphors for this 
work, while section three outlines the principles and mechanics of a hybrid model of 
semantic memory, emphasizing the connectionist mechanics of network 
representation, and providing an elegant computational account of that appealing but 
infinitely nebulous view of metaphor, Black’s Interaction View; various 
epistemological issues in metaphor and analogy are raised by this style of bottom-up 
analysis, and a discussion of such issues is presented in section four. A quantitative 
evaluation of the model is then presented in section five, where a comparative 
analysis with the SME and ACME models is reported, and epistemological 
conclusions are drawn that should, we suggest, be of some concern to practitioners of 
cognitive linguistics. The paper then concludes with an overall summary in section 
six.
2. Motivations & Guiding Metaphors
Metaphor has traditionally received short shrift from the linguistics community, who, 
in their efforts to formalize the study of language by narrowly concentrating on its 
structural makeup, seem unwilling to accommodate a phenomenon which is so deeply 
entwined with wider issues of general cognition. It would not be contentious to claim 
that the major achievement of modern structural linguistics is its formal treatment of 
syntax (see for instance Chomsky 1957), and that the study of semantics and meaning 
is somewhat unimpressive by comparison. The effects of this stance are clearly 
demonstrated in the severe limitations of the Aarts & Calbert approach (1979), which 
is rooted in the linguistic framework of generative semantics. Linguistics has pressed 
the syntactic advantage and given the study of meaning a back seat, rather like the 
man who searches for missing car keys under a street lamp, not because he suspects 
he may have lost them there, but because it is the major source of illumination 
available.
But as readers of this volume will doubtless already know, a branch of linguistic study 
has recently developed which concerns itself deeply with issues of cognition and 
conceptualization. Cognitive Linguistics may be considered the cognitive science of 
linguistics, and as such, brings the full, interdisciplinary range of issues, vocabularies, 
frameworks and methodologies to the study of language as was previously available 
to the cognitive scientist. Linguistics is now in a position to properly tackle the issues 
of metaphor comprehension without first under-estimating its power. Language is no 
longer seen simply as a formal language of abstract symbols such as NP, VP and PP, 
but as a grounded system of schemas which relate to how we are situated in the world. 
This approach, which may be called the Cognitive Grammar approach, is epitomized 
by the work of Langacker (1991), who strives to describe traditional syntactic notions 
such as nouns and verbs not in hollow formal terms, but in terms of the cognitive 
processes that underlie them. 
However, if one has a criticism of this new flank of linguistic advance, it must be its 
lack of computational sensibility. Gardner (1987) argues that computation is a 
fundamental concern of cognitive science, yet it would seem to have little sway in the 
new field of cognitive linguistics. An analysis of the 1995 proceedings of the 
International Cognitive Linguistics conference, for instance, whose main theme was 
metaphor, shows the major methodology in the field to be the Lakoffian analysis, 
whereby the dominant families of metaphors in a new domain are recognized (e.g., 
Rohrer 1995 discusses the metaphors underlying the public’s conception of the 
internet), and their systematic interactions noted. However, the importance of 
computational simulation to a new metaphor theory cannot be over-emphasized, as 
will be demonstrated by the findings reported later in this paper. For if we accept 
Gardner’s charter of cognitive science, which stresses the fundamental role of 
computers in the study of mind, we must also accept such computational results to 
pose a serious and rigid psycholinguistic constraint. 
2.1. Conceptual Bridges as Conduits for Metaphoric Activity
So powerful and cognitively-entrenched is the metaphor phenomenon that we 
frequently need to employ metaphor to describe itself, as no other descriptive tool 
seems to suffice. For example, one frequently uses the metaphor of seeing to elucidate 
the process of metaphoric comprehension: we speak of seeing one domain through the 
lens of another, which is itself an extension of Kant’s category metaphor (see Kant 
1933), who described our innate categories as the conceptual spectacles through 
which we rationalize the world. Max Black (1962) has also advocated the notion of 
metaphor as an etched plate of smoked glass, through which we visualize connected 
portions of another domain.
The work described in this paper is founded upon another metaphor -- which though 
perhaps less commonplace, is certainly more amenable to the computational 
elucidation of metaphor -- that of the conceptual bridge. A bridge is a relational 
linkage that connects concepts from two different domains of discourse, and may best 
be described as a form of family resemblance, or more computationally, a fuzzy 
membership relation. This metaphor is an extension of one that is seen as basic in 
connectionist modelling, one which views memory as a contoured semantic terrain, 
whereby contours in this space correspond to relationships, or perhaps energy 
potentials, between the points so linked (see Quinlan 1991).
The addition of a bridge to such a terrain establishes, in effect, a new linkage between 
two points on the terrain, in much the same way as does a conceptual relation. 
However, the emergent power of a metaphor is linked to the construction of new 
conceptual bridges in much the same way that regional industry is dependent upon 
local infrastructure: for just as the construction of new roads and bridges provides a 
framework for the increased flow of traffic, and thus indirectly entices new industry, 
the augmentation of memory with new conceptual bridgework provides the means for 
previously unrelated schemata to interact, giving rise in turn to new and unexpected 
metaphors. This guiding idea shall be given computational expression in this paper, 
and will be argued to provide both a solid explanation of the emergent character of 
metaphor whilst also grounding Black’s interaction theory in an unambiguous 
algorithmic form.
2.2. Three Cognitive-Mapping Theories of Analogy & Metaphor
The three theories described in this paper each represent a distinctly different 
approach (and ideology) to the problem of cognitive mapping. 
SME, the Structure Mapping Engine, occupies one extreme of a functional 
continuum, and may be described as an exhaustively optimal and maximal approach. 
For SME tirelessly produces all possible interpretations of a given analogical 
mapping, each alternate interpretation deemed maximal in the sense that no additional 
correspondence can be added to it without destroying its internal systematicity and 
coherence. Additionally, SME is optimal in the sense that it scores each alternate 
interpretation, and indicates the best mapping according to a predefined systematicity 
metric.
A systematic collection of inter-structure correspondences is termed a gmap (global 
mapping) in SME parlance. Initially, a set of root gmaps is constructed by 
systematically comparing the corresponding arguments of identical predicates in each 
structure. This set is grist for the core of SME, a factorial process which then 
produces successively larger combinations of these partial gmaps until maximal 
global mappings are generated. Clearly, the size of the initial root set is a key factor in 
the tractability of the combination process; SME employs the notion of structural 
support to limit the size of this set, exploiting systematicity across the nested 
organization of predications in each structure as an evidential basis for generating new 
roots. It is such support then that stands between SME and a sticky factorial demise.
ACME, the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine, also places great emphasis on the 
property of mapping systematicity, or isomorphism, but eschews the exhaustively 
optimal and maximal strategy pursued by SME. Instead, ACME constructs a 
constraint network for each new analogical problem, to model the various pressures of 
similarity, context and isomorphism which shape the final interpretation. This 
network is the subject of a parallelized constraint relaxation process, from which a 
sole interpretation emerges, one that is neither guaranteed to be optimal, or maximal, 
or for that matter, even wholly systematic. Unlike SME, ACME guarantees nothing, 
representing a heuristic rather than complete approach to the problem. ACME pursues 
what may be called a natural or evolutionary model of computation, in which 
environmental forces pressurize a system into converging toward a good, rather than 
optimal, solution to a problem.
Like SME, ACME is a structure matcher which compares two domain descriptions in 
a predicate-calculus-style representation. Hierarchical structure in such descriptions, 
which is originally expressed via nesting of predications, is translated into a series of 
inhibitory and excitatory linkages in the ACME network. Nodes in this network 
correspond to possible entity correspondences between the source and target domains; 
once the network is activated, the activation levels of these nodes gradually converge 
toward asymptotic values as the network proceeds through a succession of epochs 
before eventually settling. An ACME network is deemed to have settled when a 
certain large proportion of its nodes have reached their asymptote. Yet while being 
neither maximal or optimal, ACME nevertheless seems slower than SME, and is 
certainly less systematic; this puzzling result, borne out in section five, would seem to 
support to the case for exhaustive interpretation. 
Sapper, like ACME but unlike SME, is a model which claims to be neither optimal or 
maximal; but in contrast to ACME, Sapper is wholly systematic. Sapper is a network 
model which employs spreading activation with a fixed horizon to delimit the extent 
of its search. However, unlike ACME’s dedicated network model, which is 
constructed anew for each individual metaphor, Sapper is memory-situated -- as will 
be described in the next section, spreading activation is used to highlight those 
elements of long-term memory which may be relevant to the current interpretation, 
and where it is best to lay down new conceptual bridges.
2.3. Issues of Complexity Analysis
Each of the above theories has been implemented on a computer and thereby used to 
generate empirical results; such implementations indicate experimentally what the 
structural requirements of each theory are (i.e., how best should our domain 
descriptions be structured), whilst revealing the performance/competence trade-offs 
that are embodied in each theory. In an important sense, structure mapping is thus an 
excellent example of cognitive science at work, being a domain that relates directly to 
issues of human cognition, and one that is readily modelled on a computer. More 
importantly, if one accepts the charter of the discipline as outlined by Gardner (1984), 
the use of computational modelling is a fundamental element in the execution of 
cognitive science. Our working models are more than toys then, as fundamental 
limitations of computation that become apparent in such implementations may have 
dire theoretical consequences for the originating theory. That is, computational 
limitations often become cognitive limitations.
If complexity analysis is considered unpopular in the computationally oriented sub-
fields of cognitive science, drenched as it is in functional pessimism, this perception is 
even stronger in cognitive linguistics. However, although usually overlooked for this 
reason, complexity analysis is vital to cognitive theories which rely on highly 
combinatoric algorithms, such as cognitive mapping. In this sense, complexity serves 
as the ultimate cognitive science constraint.
One should not look upon complexity analysis then as solely the grim harbinger of the 
worst case scenario; when combined with systemic experiments, such analyses 
provide valuable insights into those areas of the performance curve where an NP-hard 
problem (i.e., one which is non-deterministically polynomial, and one for which most 
computer scientists suspect brutish, exhaustive, search is the only optimal strategy) 
will perform well, and also those areas where the problem is likely to factorially 
blow-up in our faces (i.e., rapidly outscaling even our best hardware). Believing that 
fore-warned is fore-armed, this paper presents an empirical analysis of cognitive 
mapping, in an attempt to systematically reveal precisely where a theory derives its 
power, and similarly, to determine the exact price a theory pays for this power.
3. Sapper: A Hybrid Model of Metaphor Interpretation
The Sapper framework, as described in Veale & Keane (1993), is a hybrid symbolic / 
connectionist model, embodying a basic philosophy which views the interpretation of 
novel metaphor as a process of connectionist bridge-building. From the Sapper 
perspective, metaphor comprehension involves the construction (or more accurately, 
the awakening) of new cross-domain linkages, which serve as bridges to bind the 
analog-pairs established by the metaphor. The novelty of a metaphor may be 
measured by the extent to which it adds to the structure of the network, as it is 
accommodated by the system. This philosophy thus views metaphor as a dynamic, 
constructive, conceptual phenomenon, which evokes a response in a reactive fashion 
from an adaptive and accommodating knowledge-base.
3.1. Memory Organization
A Sapper network is essentially a localist graph in which nodes represent concepts, 
and where arcs represent semantic relations between these concept nodes. While 
localism is often pejoratively labelled grandmother-cell coding, two significant 
architectural features arise out of a localist rather than distributed architecture: (i) 
knowledge isomorphism - the structure of a localist network directly mirrors the 
semantic composition of the knowledge represented therein; and (ii) knowledge 
parallelism - in a localist network any number of different concepts (i.e., nodes) may 
be co-active simultaneously. Now, while this first feature is simply a matter of design 
convenience, the second is arguably fundamental to the operation of metaphor, the 
heart of which is the apt juxtaposition of different concepts (see Harnad 1982). Sapper 
exploits knowledge parallelism to enable the creative reconciliation of different 
concept domains to occur, in a bottom-up fashion, by inferring cross-domain linkages, 
or bridges, where previously none existed (e.g., if generals are surgeons, then an 
operating theatre can be seen as a battlefield!).
New cross-domain bridges are laid down along dormant inter-concept connections, 
which have been established a priori by the rule-based component of the model. These 
dormant connections provide the possible routes along which metaphor creativity can 
arise. The primary role of the rule-based, symbolic, component is therefore the 
analysis of the network organization for particular consistencies of structure, and the 
augmentation of the network with new (but dormant) connections on the basis of 
these consistencies. Such dormant network linkages represent merely plausible, rather 
than fully established, semantic relations, and are thus not operative carriers of 
activation. The connectionist component of Sapper is responsible for the controlled 
propagation of activation energy, or zorch (see Hendler 1989), throughout the 
network, as it flows from the matriarch concept nodes as evoked by the metaphor. The 
matriarch concepts of a metaphor, following Richards (1936), are known as the tenor, 
or metaphorized subject, and the vehicle, or metaphorizing object. The task of the 
connectionist component, then, is to predict which dormant linkages should 
eventually be awakened, to become active bridges linking the domains of the tenor 
and vehicle concepts. 
Figure 1 depicts such a scenario during the interpretation of the metaphor "Composers 
are Generals" (or vice versa). Whenever waves of competing activation meet at a 
dormant linkage, that linkage forms the basis of an initial match hypothesis. Because 
dormant linkages are laid down by the rule-based component on the basis of local 
consistencies of structure, the hypothesis stage is thus, in a strong sense, driven by 
both literal similarity and higher-order structural constraints. And because activation 
originates at the concept nodes of the tenor and vehicle, the connectionist phase 
integrates the base-filtering and hypothesis formation stages of processing.
Figure 1: A dormant linkage between the concepts Baton and Sabre is deemed to 
provide a plausible match hypothesis when it becomes a cross-over path for 
competing activation waves from the tenor and vehicle concept nodes.
Returning to our current metaphor example, the Sapper system awakens a range of 
initial cross-domain bridges in response to the juxtaposition of Composer and 
General, some of which are eventually recognized to be globally inconsistent, and 
therefore returned to a dormant state. The bridges that survive produce the following 
mappings: 
[.86] If Composer is like General
[.25] Then Concert-Theatre is like Battle-Theatre
[.75] and Orchestra is like Army
[.94] and Musician is like Soldier
[.98] and Musical-Instrument is like Musket
[.95] and Baton is like Sabre
[.92] and Musical-Score is like Battle-Plan
[.93] and Percussion is like Artillery
[.96] and Drum is like Cannon etc.
The number specified in square brackets to the left of each mapping is a numeric 
measure, between -1 and +1, of the perceived similarity of the related concepts after
the metaphor has been comprehended. This measure combines a metric for both the 
literality similarity of the related items (e.g., Drums and Cannons are loud and 
booming), and the higher-order similarity that is now seen to exist between the two 
(e.g., the relation between Drum and Cannon supports the second-order mapping 
Percussion: Artillery, which in turn supports the mapping Orchestra: Army). 
The Sapper rule component employs two distinct constructor rules to augment the 
knowledge-base with dormant conceptual bridges --- the Triangulation Rule and the 
Squaring Rule. In essence, these rules compile into the knowledge-base the top-down 
knowledge that is necessary to infer systematic cross-domain binding; and because 
this knowledge is automatically pre-compiled into the network, the connectionist 
phase is spared the necessity of performing global structural analysis, and is therefore 
adequately modelled as a spreading activation process. The Triangulation rule is 
invoked whenever two concept nodes share a common association or superclass, as is 
the case with the concepts Musical-Instrument:Musket & Hand-held, Drum:Cannon & 
Loud, Baton:Sabre & Long, Battle-Theatre:Concert-Theatre & Theatre, and 
Stave:Contour & Line, laying down dormant linkages between the schemata Musical-
Instrument and Musket, Drum and Cannon, Baton and Sabre, Battle-Theatre and 
Concert-Theatre, and Stave and Contour. The Squaring rule, which is a second-order 
constructor -- inasmuch at it may act upon the linkages laid down by the triangulation 
rule -- is used to build (or reinforce) the bridges Orchestra:Army, Percussion: 
Artillery, Musical-Instrument: Musket, and Musical-Score:Battle-Plan. The Squaring 
rule thus builds bridges upon bridges, each new linkage extending the inter-domain 
reach of the last; in this way Sapper accounts for the phenomenon of domain 
incongruence -- the non-literal sharing of attributes between domains (see Tourangeau 
& Sternberg 1981). The mechanics of these two rules are illustrated in Figure 2:
Figure 2: The Triangulation Rule (i) and the Squaring Rule (ii) augment the 
knowledge base with additional dormant structures, precompiled pathways that may 
later be used to form cross-domain analog bindings. The Triangulation rule infers 
new structure on the basis of shared associations, while the squaring rule employs 
shared metaphoric bridges (previously awakened dormant bridges, or established 
metaphors) as an evidential basis. 
The Sapper memory network fragment corresponding to the Composer: General 
metaphor is illustrated below in Figure 3:
Figure 3: Sapper description of the metaphor "Composers are Generals". 
Note that the triangulation and squaring rules are wholly independent of any particular 
comprehension task. Full metaphor comprehension is only initiated once the 
matriarch nodes corresponding to the tenor (Composer) and vehicle (General) have 
been clamped, and the connectionist component proceeds to propagate activation 
from these source nodes; in our current example, this causes the dormant linkages 
between Composer: General, Baton: Sabre, Percussion: Artillery, scalpel:Cleaver, and 
Concert-Theatre: Battle-Theatre to be recognized as initial match hypotheses. Sapper 
then directs these linkages to be provisionally awakened, thereby providing an basis 
for the squaring rule to infer even higher-level structural hypotheses.
3.2. Metaphor Interactivity
The opening of these bridges allows activation to flow freely between the tenor and 
vehicle domains, altering the activation dynamics of the network in such a way that 
the tenor actually interacts with the vehicle at a conceptual level. This network effect 
is illustrated below in Figure 4:
Figure 4: The awakening of a new bridge alters the activation dynamics of the 
network, allowing zorch (Z) to flow freely between two domains.
The hard activation patterns of General, Battle, Artillery, Musket and Cannon interact 
with the softer patterns of Composer, Music-Composition, Percussion, Musical-
Instrument and Drum to produce a response to the metaphor. Overall, a Composer is 
seen, through the lens of the metaphor, to be an altogether more authoritative and 
commanding figure, leading loyal musicians into the fray, while amidst the booms 
and swells of performance, wielding a conductors baton to dictate the course of the 
action. A fancifully graphic interpretation to be sure, but one that, in following the 
interaction view of Richards (1936) and Black (1962), operates both ways. The 
metaphor toughens composers, but softens generals, who are now seen to be that 
much less hardened and impassionate, and altogether more artistic and romantic.
4. Epistemological Issues in Metaphor Comprehension
Linguistic metaphors come in different syntactic guises: qualification metaphors of 
the adjective: noun variety, object-centred metaphors of the noun: noun variety, and 
predicate-centred metaphors of the verb: verb variety. While it is to be expected that 
each form is interpreted relative to the same knowledge structures, full comprehension 
of each form may stress different aspects of those structures than others, and overall, 
adopt a different epistemological perspective on the organization of memory. 
Surprisingly, even metaphor theories which claim to be generalized structure 
matchers, such as SME, the Structure Mapping Engine of Falkenhainer, Forbus and 
Gentner (1989), embody hard-wired epistemological biases which make them more 
suited to one guise of metaphor over another. SME is essentially a symbolic graph 
matching mechanism, which is nevertheless claimed to model the metaphor 
comprehension process in Gentner, Falkenhainer & Skorstad (1989). This section will 
set the stage for the empirical demonstration in the next, arguing that objected-centred 
metaphors of the noun: noun variety comprise a significant Achilles’ heel of SME. As 
our analysis will reveal, this weakness derives from an epistemological bias in SME’s 
design, which leads the unwary matcher to a factorial demise for certain types of 
domain structure in which hierarchical organization is present but implicit. This 
factorial demise is also exacerbated by SME’s refusal to employ literal similarity as a 
constraint on the creation of initial match hypotheses. The empirical results also 
suggest that such a refusal to effectively limit the number of initial match hypotheses 
also ham-strings the connectionist-flavoured ACME model of Holyoak & Thagard 
(1989). ACME, the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine, builds a new constraint 
network for each metaphoric comparison, and allows this network to iteratively 
converge from an initial random state toward an ordered final state that encodes a 
suitable domain mapping. The evidence presented here casts serious epistemological 
doubts on the validity of these models both as generalized matching systems, and as 
cognitive theories of human metaphor comprehension.
4.1 Object-Centred Representations
Metaphors which contrive the juxtaposition of two object concepts, such as Surgeon 
& Butcher, or Car & Rocket, will more readily exploit the object-centred aspects of 
these concepts in memory. That is to say, those aspects of conceptual representation 
which emphasize objects and entities over actions and events, such as meronomic, 
taxonomic and associational structures — how an object is defined in terms of its own 
behaviour, rather than the higher-order actions and events in which it participates —
make the greatest contribution to the analysis of noun: noun metaphors. For instance, 
the physical properties of an entity — such as its size, weight, component structure, 
etc. — contribute toward the object-centred view of that entity, while the historical 
character of an entity — who it married, what it does on Sundays, etc. — constitute 
the predicate-centred or event-centred view of that entity. This form of representation 
is illustrated in the example metaphor of Figure 5:
Figure 5: Object-Centred Representations for the concept schemata of Composer and 
General. Notation: The labelling scheme differs from that employed in previous 
diagrams, as our discussion is to be a general one concerning representation issues, 
and is not specific to the Sapper mechanism.
The epistemological style of Figure 6 may be considered object-centred inasmuch as 
object/entity nodes establish the foreground of the representation, while inter-concept 
relations are strung between these nodes like tinsel on a Christmas tree. The 
significant point to note about this representational form is that linkages as well as 
nodes are labelled, and thus, both types of graph component may be considered to be 
first-class representational elements. As illustrated earlier in Figures 3 and 4, this is 
the representational form adopted by Sapper, for reasons that will become clearer later 
in this paper.
4.2. Scenario-Centred or Predicate-Centred Representations
Whereas object-centred metaphors tend to focus upon the entities of a domain, 
scenario-based or predicate-centred metaphors are naturally more disposed toward the 
relational structure that exists between these entities. Curiously enough, this shift in 
emphasis is achieved by denying labelling privileges to the linkages which connect 
the nodes of the representation, forcing the knowledge-base to encode both actions 
and objects as nodes. The linkages of a predicate-centred representation exist only to 
tie the argument nodes of a predicate to the predicate node itself, in effect then 
establishing a graph notation for the predicate calculus. For in much the same way 
that arguments go unlabelled in a predicate calculus expression, relying wholly upon 
ordering constraints to define their relationship to the governing predicate, the nodes 
of a predicate-centred representation also rely upon surface ordering to convey 
implicit deep relationships. This style of representation is illustrated in Figure 6 
below, in expressing the oft-employed Karla the Hawk story which typifies the 
SME/ACME approaches to analogy:
Figure 6: The Karla the Hawk story. (a) illustrates a representation of this predicate-
centred domain in which nodes only are labelled (following the SME approach). 
Notation: Black nodes represent predicates, and grey nodes represent entities.
It is toward this form of domain that predicate-centred representations are best suited, 
problems where one hierarchical relational structure, essentially a nested predication, 
is matched with another. In a predicate-centred model of analogy such as Gentner’s 
SME, predicate nodes (depicted in black) are mapped under a strict identicality 
constraint, while entity nodes (depicted in grey) may conceivably map onto any entity 
node in the target domain, provided the 1-to-1 coherence of the overall mapping is 
preserved. Entity nodes are therefore almost incidental to the mapping process in a 
predicate-centred representation, as it is the predicates and their relationship to each 
other that ultimately determine the basis of the analogy.
Figure 7: An object-centred representation can nevertheless neatly express the 
meaning of a predicate-centred domain , while labelling both nodes and links.
As illustrated in Figure 7 above, however, an object-centred representation is equally 
capable of expressing predicate-centred domains. In fact, to our minds, the above 
representation is preferable to that of Figure 6, as the role of each entity (grey node) is 
explicitly annotated with a case-role labelling. In addition, the use of a predicate case 
role which can take several values means that more than one predicate can be 
assigned to a particular action; thus, the act of bargaining can be described as both an 
instance of a Discuss and Bargain predication, providing greater scope for matches 
with other, analogous events (e.g., allowing a match between a Placate and Bargain 
action).
4.3. Support Relations
While different models of metaphor and analogy may place different degrees of 
significance on the role of structural isomorphism, most theories (such as SME, 
ACME and Sapper) ultimately acknowledge that analogy and metaphor are, by and 
large, structure-preserving processes. Philosophically, this is an unavoidable, indeed 
almost tautological, position to assume, for in any formal/computational system, 
meaning is necessarily explicated in structural terms, so where structure is not 
respected, neither is meaning. In the ACME approach, the structure of the tenor and 
vehicle domains dictates the structure of the constraint network that is especially 
constructed for the interpretative task at hand; the conceptual structure of the tenor 
and vehicle is thus the major source of constraints upon the mapping process. In the 
Sapper approach, the conceptual structure of the tenor and vehicle domains not only 
provides the evidential basis of the triangulation and squaring rules, but also defines 
the pathways along which activation energy will flow to awaken new cross-domain 
bridges. And in the SME approach, the hierarchical structure of the tenor and vehicle 
domains is used to constrain, in a top-down fashion, the combinatorial possibilities of 
cross-domain entity mappings. Each model therefore, in its own way, looks to the 
structural make-up of the tenor and vehicle to indicate what partial mappings support 
other partial mappings, and which partial mappings are irreconcilable with each other.
A metaphor interpretation system must, therefore, take its support relations wherever 
it can find them. However, certain models, such as SME and ACME, place far too 
much emphasis on the importance of hierarchical support as manifested by nested 
predicate structures, to the detriment of other forms of support relation. These models 
exhibit a serious epistemological blind-side, an oversight which makes them 
inherently unsuited to the interpretation of noun: noun metaphors and any other form 
of comparison that requires an object-centred representation. To see why this must be 
so, consider the predicate-centred re-representation of a domain that is more amenable 
to object-centred organization, as illustrated in Figure 8 on the following page.
The most striking quality of the representations in Figure 8 must surely be the obvious 
lack of hierarchical depth - gone are the tree structures of Figure 6, rich in vertical 
support relations, to be replaced by a shallow and un-nested representation that 
favours horizontal rather than vertical expansion. However, all that has been 
performed here is an alternative depiction of the same knowledge structures - a graph 
re-labelling in which no knowledge has been added or removed - and thus, on a 
syntactic level, the form may have changed but the meaning has been preserved.
Effectively, the reader will observe that the support structures which found vertical 
expression in an object-centred representation have simply been sheared to find 
horizontal expression in a predicate-centred representation, while the support relations 
which were manifest hierarchically in the former are now present in the latter in a 
sideways systematic fashion. However, models such as SME and ACME which are 
locked into a particular form of processing, and are algorithmically predisposed to 
seeking support structure in hierarchical rather than horizontal organization, fail 
completely to acknowledge this sideways systematicity.
In the terminology of SME, each predicate node in Figure 8 (illustrated in black) 
comprises a root mapping in the overall analogy, inasmuch as each predicate is 
ungoverned by a higher-order relation (in contrast, say, with the structures of Figure 
7). Unfortunately, the SME algorithm includes a root merging stage whose 
complexity is factorially dependent upon the number of such roots (this merge stage is 
described in Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner 1989). Clearly, if every predicate in the 
tenor and vehicle domain is to be considered a root, then SME quickly descends into 
factorial hell. Likewise, the excitatory and inhibitory linkages which codify the 
support relations in an ACME constraint network are laid down on the basis of 
hierarchical support; if this support is not perceived in a sideways fashion, the 
constraint network may become underdetermined.
Figure 8: A Predicate-centred view of the domains of Composer and General. Arrows 
are provided to indicate the direction in which predicate arguments should be read. 
Compare these flat structures with the hierarchical depth of the equivalent object-
centred views illustrated in Figure 6.
However, unlike the structure-bound SME, the connectionist ACME employs a form 
of spreading activation which can horizontally cut across structures, thereby 
enforcing in some astructural manner the sideways systematicity inherent in the 
representation. In effect, spreading activation facilitates a form of lateral thinking, in 
which one part of the network may reinforce another, even when these regions are not 
connected by some overarching hierarchical relation. Consider again the example of 
Figure 8: activation may propagate upwards and sideways, allowing the network to 
transcend the limitations of simple vertical support, to additionally exploit horizontal 
support relations. However, while more epistemological sure than SME, a more 
secure case against ACME can nevertheless be made on grounds of scalability, and 
such a case is addressed in the next section.
4.4. Epistemological Commitments
In the final analysis, then, noun: noun metaphors demand an object-centred 
representation if the support relations manifest in the structural make-up of the tenor 
and vehicle domains are to be made explicit. If the sample metaphor of Figure 7 
illustrates the suitability of a predicate-centred representation for verb: verb 
comparisons, the example of Figure 8 clearly demonstrates the error of shoehorning
noun: noun metaphors into such a representation. Indeed, while an object-centred 
representation is readily augmented to accommodate verb: verb metaphors, no simple 
additions can be made to a predicate-centred representation to accommodate noun: 
noun metaphors. Any such changes would shake at the very roots of the host theory, 
and substantially reformulate that theory to the extent that it bore no resemblance to 
the original. It would seem then that the representation of choice in the Sapper model, 
an object-centred localist network, is best suited to the rigours of a metaphor 
interpretation system that is to tackle figurality in its variety of linguistic forms. This 
view is borne out in the experimental evaluation described in the next section, in 
which such doubts regarding the epistemological foundations of SME and ACME are 
given quantitative form.
5. Quantitative Evaluation and Analysis
The quantitative evaluation of Sapper described in this section was carried out within 
a sample memory network containing 284 concept nodes and 1597 user-specified 
inter-concept relation links. This network represents a description of the profession 
domain, and contains conceptual schemata for fifteen different profession types, such 
as Surgeon, Composer, Butcher, General, Scientist, and so on. The total number of 
automatic inferences generated by Sapper while assimilating this network description 
is 2299 dormant conceptual bridges, all of which are created using the triangulation 
rule, as higher-order inferences only occur during metaphor comprehension. On 
average then, each profession schemata comprises 19 localist concept nodes, and 106 
inter-node linkages. Of these linkages, 36 codify high-level relations (such as Cause 
and Depend), and 70 codify attributions and taxonomic orderings; while this 
distinction is an artificial one which means nothing at all to Sapper, the distinction is 
nevertheless considered valid in the context of SME. The following profession types 
are defined in this network:
Surgeon Butcher General Priest Scientist
Architect Politician Criminal Hacker Chef
Accountant Author Magician Composer Sculptor
The following network linkages are used to encode semantic relations within and 
amongst these conceptual schemata:
Attribute Control Part Substance Purpose Effect
Instrument Predicate Aspect Perform Affect Create
Connect Disconnect Up Down Manner Source
Target Method Agent Patient Event Character
Metaphor
The linkages Effect, Manner, Method, Target, Purpose, Event, Character, Agent, 
Patient and Instrument are provided for the description of verb-centred scenarios, for 
example, the J.F.K. political setting, or the King Arthur legends (the latter yielding 
good metaphors for the former), while the linkage Metaphor is provided to allow the 
knowledge engineer to encode conventional metaphors into the network (such as the 
Family Tree and Gene Pool metaphors). 
5.1. A Quantification of Automatic Inference
Given such a test-bed environment, the scene is set to ask some basic empirical 
questions regarding the profligacy of automatic inference, as performed by the 
triangulation and squaring rules. For instance, what kind of worst-case and average-
case scenarios can be imagined here? Even if Sapper were to push the limits of 
prodigality in the creation of dormant linkages, the worst case scenario involves the 
generation of n*(n-1)/2 dormant linkages, where n is the number of localist nodes in 
semantic memory; large to be sure, but hardly nightmarish in its extent. And as it 
happens, the average case performance is much lower than this ceiling, the effect of 
well-defined domain structure being to considerably reduce the possibilities of inter-
node bridging. This situation is illustrated in Figure 9 following, in which the bridging 
overhead of our profession test-bed network is graphed.
Figure 9: Number of user-specified concept relations graphed against number of 
system-inferred bridges. 
Note that the network seems to reach a critical mass at just under 200 nodes, at which 
point the system begins to out-produce the knowledge-engineer in adding linkages to 
the network. But when the network reaches 300 concept nodes in size, the worst-case 
model predicts that 44850 dormant linkages will have been automatically inferred, 
while the real situation presents a more tractable picture: just over 2000 such linkages, 
less that five percent of the worst case scenario, are actually added to the network. 
Sapper thus seems to exhibit remarkable thrift in its automatic inference capabilities.
Of course, these bridges do not necessarily have to be held in the system until they are 
used, if ever; rather, they might be created dynamically as the metaphoric context 
dictates. This is achievable by delaying application of the triangulation rule until the 
spreading activation phase of metaphor interpretation - as each node is newly 
activated, the triangulation rule is applied to that node and to those other nodes which 
are currently active within the scope of the rule. This is the classic computational 
trade-off in space versus time, whereby the storage costs of maintaining many, 
potentially useless, bridges is translated into processing costs at run-time. 
5.2. An Experiment
This profession network provides a suitable test environment in which to perform a 
comparative evaluation of Sapper, SME and ACME; disregarding issues of metaphor 
symmetry, focusing instead on the concerns of structural consistency and mapping 
coherence, fifteen different concept descriptions yield one hundred and five different 
figurative comparisons. Running upon this pool of 105 test metaphors, Sapper 
achieves a respectable average interpretation time of 12.5 seconds per metaphor. The 
incremental case, wherein the same metaphors are presented to the system a second 
time, shows that this time drops to less than six seconds for metaphors that have been 
previously encountered. Of course, since Sapper is the only model of the three which 
incorporates any real notion of long-term memory in comprehension, it is the only 
model to exhibit this effect. Moreover, neither SME or ACME provide any concrete 
results whatsoever, for any of the test metaphors, even when they are allowed to run 
for days at a time, yielding an effective destruct-test of Allegro Common Lisp but 
little else. Eventually then, unable to obtain performance ratings for SME or ACME 
on this test network, a tabulation the number of initial match hypotheses generated by 
each model is instead provided. This data proves to be revelatory in clearly 
demonstrating the cause of failure in SME and ACME -- too many initial match 
hypotheses cause each model to become intractable in later stages of processing. This 
finding is illustrated in Figure 10 on the following page. Note that Sapper’s average
mapping competence has been determined by running a time consuming exhaustive-
search variant of the basic Sapper algorithm to obtain the perfect mapping score for 
each test metaphor; the mapping score awarded by the standard Sapper algorithm is 
then compared to this optimum to obtain an average measure of Sapper’s expected 
competence.
As can be seen in Figure 10, Sapper on average generates considerably less match 
hypotheses than SME (18 versus 386), while SME in turn is significantly more thrifty 
than ACME (386 versus 12657). Sapper’s hypothesizing thrift arises from its 
dependence on conceptual bridges, which are only ever created when there exists a 
first-order (literal) or higher-order (creative) similarity between two concepts. SME, 
however, employs no such notion of similarity and instead prefers to temper match 
selection using the notion of predicate identicality. ACME is the prodigal son of the 
trio, eschewing even predicate identicality and instead favouring the weaker 
constraint of arity-matching. No wonder then that ACME fails to generate a mapping 
for any metaphor; while not as prone to the epistemological blind-sight that so afflicts 
SME, ACME instead suffers from network bloat - the constraint network developed 
for each metaphoric comparison is simply to large to be resolved in any reasonable 
amount of time.
Aspect / System SME ACME Sapper
System Competence Optimal N/A (sub-
optimal)
98% of optimal
Match Hypotheses (M.H) 386 12657 18
M. H. Incremental Case Unchanged Unchanged 7
Time per Metaphor Worst case 
O(2386) seconds
N/A 12.5 seconds
Time Incremental Case N/A -
Unchanged
N/A -
Unchanged
5.8 seconds
Figure 10: Comparative evaluation of Sapper, SME and ACME as determined within 
the Profession test network. Note that the unavailability of time figures for SME and 
ACME reflects the inability of these models to generate a result in real time.
5.3. Factorial Death
Although considerably less prodigal than ACME in generating match hypotheses, 
SME is nevertheless inherently factorial in its root global mapping (gmap) merge 
stage of processing. Now, because of its inability to determine sideways support 
relations in an object-centred domain (of which the profession test-bed is an 
exemplar), each linkage in every concept description forms the basis of a root gmap, 
and thus, SME is combinatorial over the number of linkages in each concept 
description. To appreciate the complexity implications of this, consider the metaphor 
General as Surgeon - which causes SME to generate 398 distinct root gmaps. The 
worst case scenario for the merge stage thus necessitates the consideration of as many 
as 2398 mapping combinations, a scenario of truly nightmarish proportions. To 
further appreciate the enormity of this number, consider that if a dedicated analogy 
machine (or engine, as SME and ACME are viewed by their creators) were capable of 
performing a generous one trillion gmap merges a second, the General-Surgeon 
example might still occupy this machine for over U5 years, where U is a conservative 
estimate of the age of the universe at fourteen billion years. Clearly, this is a hole 
from which even massive parallelism is powerless to rescue a theory.
5.4. A.C.M.E: Return to Sender?
ACME is an intriguing acronym, but one which perhaps has too many evocations of 
the classic Loony Tunes animation of Chuck Jones than any one theory should have to 
bear. As with those infamous packages marked A.C.M.E. which constantly promise 
instant Road-runner doom but which instead boomerang on an ever-unsuspecting 
Wile E. Coyote, the analogical model ACME would also seem to advertise much 
more than it delivers. Perhaps the comparison is undeserved (though irresistible!) 
inasmuch as ACME offers a connectionist perspective on metaphor analysis, which as 
this paper argues, is needed if all of contingent world knowledge is to be 
opportunistically made available to the comprehension process. However, ACME 
spurns this advantage of connectionism by necessitating the construction of a 
dedicated network for each metaphor analysis, in effect a priori separating ACME 
from this wealth of experiential knowledge in long-term memory. Thus, an ACME 
network is not so much a representation of that subset of the mental landscape in 
which the metaphor is interpreted, but a meta-representation of such representations 
that has to be constructed on the fly. Connectionism in this context should thus grant 
no biological kudos; indeed, if its creators hope to claim neurological plausibility with 
connectionism, one must view such dedicated construction as the computational 
equivalent of tumour growth!
As stated in section 5.2, no final results were forthcoming from our profession domain 
tests on ACME, as the scale of its network operation simply overwhelmed our test 
environment (a SPARC 2 running Allegro Lisp with 64 megabytes of RAM). To 
obtain some real data, ACME was run with a subset of the profession domain 
metaphors, each run evaluating metaphoric comparisons of successively larger 
predicate count (in the region of 5 ... 30 predicates for each tenor); Figure 11 
following graphs the average number of nodes in each network so created against the 
average convergence time for each network.
Though prediction of network convergence times is in general a black and highly non-
deterministic art, our experience with ACME on the larger test suite suggests that 
convergence time is exponentially related to network size; this intuition is borne out 
by Figure 11, which illustrates the closeness of an exponential fit to the actual results. 
ACME thus succumbs to the same factorial fate as SME, a victim of its own 
spendthrift nature and tendency toward network bloat.
Figure 11: Graph of average ACME network convergence times versus size of 
network in links, as derived from a representative subset of metaphors from the 
professions domain. The jagged outline area records the experimental results, whilst 
the black curve is an exponential fit for these results.
5.5. Counter-Arguments from the SME Camp
Consider the following rebuttal: SME does not work upon these profession examples 
simply because they are structurally-impoverished and causally-deficient. In short, the 
test metaphors are contrived and thus invalid because any hierarchical causal structure 
has been removed, but if causal structure were correctively added to these examples, 
SME would perform adequately upon them. This line of argument is fallacious for the 
following reasons:
(i) In no way should these object-centred domains be considered structurally 
or causally lacking. The network linkages Effect, Control, Perform, Method, 
Purpose and so on are provided to explicitly represent causal relations, and 
these may be stringed together, in a sideways fashion, to construct complex 
causal structures.
(ii) A suitable graphical representation in which both nodes and links are 
labelled demonstrates that there is indeed hierarchical structure inherent in 
these object-centred domains. It is simply a matter for the analogy system in 
question to seek out this structure using the correct filter (e.g., vertical versus 
horizontal support).
(iii) Even if these examples were structurally impoverished, would this excuse 
SME’s apparent ultra-sensitivity to representation? No, at best the SME theory 
should provide an algorithmic basis for determining the suitability of its inputs 
in advance, rather than having to spend geological time demonstrating the 
deficiency of the representation.
(iv) An empirical demonstration of the presence of this structure, and its 
sufficiency for analogical mapping, is provided by the Sapper mechanism and 
its ability to recognize and map this structure.
In summary then, these results show the SME approach to be seriously lacking in 
mapping competence, and not at all the general-purpose matching algorithm it 
purports to be (see Falkenhainer, Forbus & Gentner 1989).
6. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has presented both the driving motivations and basic philosophy 
underlying the Sapper model of memory for metaphor comprehension. As stated in 
the introduction, a computational treatment of metaphor as a first-class cognitive 
phenomenon, which addresses the various signature phenomena debated in the 
literature, raises a number of interesting issues concerning knowledge representation. 
Namely, how is systematicity among different conceptual schemata from different 
domains to be enforced? How best should these schemata be organized to ensure that 
the most natural interpretation of a metaphor emerges from, or is shaped by, the 
existing knowledge-base, rather than being eked out by a dedicated metaphor 
processor? What characterizes learning in the interpretation of novel metaphors, and 
how should this learning be constrained to occur in a systematic manner? How can 
metaphors be reified to the status of active conceptual entities, such that they 
dynamically strive to impose themselves upon incoming schemata, and in doing so 
elaborate themselves further?
A hybrid model has been presented to address these issues, marrying the 
complementary strengths of the symbolic and connectionist paradigms to combine 
both high-level structural inference with low-level opportunistic activation flow. The 
Sapper model of connectionist bridge-building, it is argued, provides a computational 
framework that is truest to the interaction view of metaphor, as advocated by Richards 
and Black, while explicating the manner in which metaphors move from attention-
winning novelty to trite conventionality. Sapper operates in a bottom-up fashion, and 
thereby complements the top-down strategy of conceptual scaffolding developed in 
Veale & Keane (1992a,b) to yield a comprehensive account of the metaphor 
phenomenon, at both a lexical semantics and a deep conceptual level.
Sapper also provides a computational account of metaphor creativity that is 
essentially based upon the exaggeration of domain incongruences. Local similarities 
of a literal nature, initially established using the triangulation rule, are magnified by 
repeated application of the squaring rule, in the appropriate network contexts, to 
generate higher-order similarities that simply did not exist before interpretation of the 
metaphor. In this way, Sapper offers a cognitively appealing view of metaphor as a 
creative force that invents, rather than simply observes, new associations between 
concepts.
Sapper also provides a flexible network model that is amenable to the interpretation of 
metaphors in different linguistic guises, whether noun: noun, adjective: noun or verb: 
verb. Each of these forms are interpreted relative to an object-centred representation 
which highlights some epistemological concerns about the structural foundations of 
the SME and ACME models. While Sapper is capable of handling metaphors that 
prefer object-based descriptions (such as General: Surgeon) and predicate-based 
descriptions (such as Karla the Hawk story analogies), SME is shown to be competent 
with the former only, becoming factorially unhinged when expected to deal with 
metaphors of the latter variety. This result casts a shadow not only over SME’s claim 
to be a generalized structure-mapping engine, but also upon any serious pretensions to 
cognitive plausibility its creators may entertain.
To conclude, should the reader wish to examine the experimental data for his or 
herself, it may be obtained (in Sapper, SME and ACME formats) from the Metaphor 
Home Page: http://www.cs.tcd.ie/www/raveale/metaphor.html.
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